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The Decolonisation of East Timor: A Historical Review

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These were in the pile of papers from Jakarta awaiting me on my return. Lord Carnell

INTRODUCTION

The 25th April 1974 coup d'etat in Portugal has brought about two new political programmes, namely those of democratisation and decolonisation. The democratisation idea has emerged as a reaction to the authoritarian and fascist nature of the old regime, while that of decolonisation has resulted from the bitter realities of the colonial wars in Africa.

The idea of decolonisation which grew both within young officers circles and in the mind of General Spinola sprang from the same background. As a result of the war in its African colonies, Portugal was left behind and was backward among the European countries. From the idea of decolonisation policies emerged afterwards. However since in the wake of the coup there emerged two poles determining political strategies, its decolonisation policies had two versions as well. One was the version of Spinola which was conservative in nature and the other that of the Armed Forces Movement (young officers movement) which was radical and consequent. Nonetheless, both had a similar background and motives, namely to endeavour to rescue the Portuguese nation and state overburdened by their colonial wars in Africa, from getting poorer and backward. Thus, Portugal's decolonisation policies were not based on the demands of times and on the awareness that independence is the right of all nations, compelling the abolition of all kinds of colonialism as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice.

Above mentioned coup did not only bring about radical changes within Portugal, but it also opened a new page in the political history of its colonies.

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New measures and promises of the new regime of General De Spinola, while not fully fulfilling the expectations of the freedom movements in its colonies, provided new breath and greater opportunities to the freedom fighters.

In East Timor, those promises comprised among other things: the restoration of civil rights including democratic rights, the dissolution of the People's National Action government party; the disbandment of the secret police who were haunting the people; the abolition of the press cencorship; and the people were free to form political parties and to take part in formulating government policies. Furthermore, the new regime also intended to apply decolonisation principles to its overseas provinces and to hold a referendum to determine the political status and future of each country. The Government was consequently to accept its outcome. On the basis of those decolonisation policies, there emerged in East Timor three political parties, namely Apodeti (Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense -- Timorese Popular Democratic Association), UDT (Unido Democratica Timorense -- Timorese Democratic Union) and Fretelin (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente -- Revolutionary Front of East Timor).

THE PARTY SYSTEM IN EAST TIMOR

During the Portuguese colonial rule, there was only one party, namely the People's National Action (ANP) government party. In keeping with its decolonisation policies, Portugal provided the people of East Timor with the opportunity to establish political parties. This opportunity however has actually harmed the people of East Timor since the level of their education was very limited and they were still faced with the more fundamental problems of meeting their daily basic needs and did not yet need political parties. Being a community which firmly upheld tradition, where the king was at the same time the leader and exemplar of the people, socio-political institutions, such as political parties, were only utilised by the notables of the community with narrow interests, who formed groupings which could endanger their communal spirit in determining their future. For that reason the aspirations of the people could not be channeled through such modern political institutions. Against such a background the understanding of the party system in East Timor could be put into a better proportion.

On the basis of the chronology of their establishment, these political parties in East Timor can be listed as follows:

UDT

UDT was formed on 12th May 1974, by a group of 23 notables of the community and constituted the largest party. Within UDT there were three lines of thought on the decolonisation policies. One was the line of thought under the influence of Ir. Mario Viegas Carrascalao, i.e. that the people themselves should determine their fate. This aspiration was based on the consideration that with such formulation UDT would reach a wider sphere of acceptance in the community. In addition, it was believed that the genuine aspiration of the people of East Timor was to integrate into the Republic of Indonesia. Another group under the leadership of Moutinho, wanted to preserve the status quo, namely that East Timor should remain under the protection of Portugal. And the third one supported by a group under Dominggos da Oliveira, wanted East Timor to become federated with Portugal. Among those three groups, the one under Mario Viegas Carrascalao seemed to have the strongest support as its aspiration was based on the freedom of the people to decide their own fate. This aspiration had the largest sphere of acceptance as it was viewed as the appropriate way to enhance the dignity of the people of East Timor. Although this aspiration did not explicitly desire integration into the Republic of Indonesia, it also obtained the backing of those people who wanted integration with the Republic of Indonesia.

In the further UDT development, on the basis of the consideration that it was necessary to expeditiously save the people from Fretilin's attrocities the UDT leadership decided to explicitly declare their wish to integrate with the Republic of Indonesia. This caused divisions within UDT and some joint Fretilin while others opted for the Portuguese citizenship. A major part, however, supported UDT to accept the above mentioned decision.

Fretilin

Fretilin was previously known as Associacio Social Democratica Timorense (Timorese Social Democratic Association - ASDT) which was formed on 20th May 1974 by several people, including Jose Manuel Ramos Horta, who afterwards became its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, while its chairman was Francisco Xavier do Amaral. The change of the party's name took place after the arrival of 5 students from Lissabon in August 1974. From then on the name Fretilin has been used. Besides the fact that its programme became more stable the pattern of its movement shifted to Marxism. Fretilin rejected the principles of UDT and Apodeti, and maintained its own principle, namely full independence from any country for East Timor. Although Fretilin believed that Indonesia had an important position in Southeast Asia, and felt

the need to teach the Indonesian language in East Timor schools (because many use it), Ramos Horta was of the opinion that the culture, language and customs of Indonesia are very different from those of the people of East Timor who in his view are closer to those of Portugal. On account of that, Portuguese was made the official language, while Tetum which was acknowledged as a language much understood and used by the people of East Timor was in his judgement not complete and not fit to be used as the official language.

Apodeti

Apodeti was previously known as Timor-Indonesia Integration Association (AITI), formed on 27th May 1974 by Fernando Osario Soares, a former Portuguese refugee. In this party there was also Arnaldo Dos Reis Araujo. This party has always been assumed to be a group with the aspiration for integration with the Republic of Indonesia. Part of this assumption is true as one of the components of Apodeti was the AITI which from the very outset had that aspiration. It should be noted, however, that there were many people who had such aspiration but did not joint Apodeti. Conversely, not all members of Apodeti had the aspiration for a genuine integration. At least there were within Apodeti elements who at first had another aspiration, namely to unite East Timor with the Western part of Timor into a self-governing country. That was however natural dynamics in the christalisation process, and eventually that group achieved a consensus on integration with Indonesia.

AITI was essentially the legalisation of long standing freedom movements in East Timor. Many prominent members of that party were fighters in the popular rebellion of 1945-1949 in Los Palos. For that reason, as was the case with struggles at that time, the formation of Apodeti was based on the aspiration of the people of East Timor who felt themselves being part of the Indonesian people, who were isolated because of centuries old disputes between Dutch and Portuguese colonisers, which were later settled through the treaty of 1904 which formalised the division of the Island of Timor into two parts. However, as the dispute continued, the matter was submitted to the arbitration tribunal at The Hague in 1946. This tribunal decided that Holland was to continue to control Western Timor, while Portugal, in addition to Eastern Timor was also given Atauro Island (to the north of Dili) and Oekusi region on the North coast of Western Timor.

Historical sentiments which were widespread among the people generated the belief that the separation of East Timor from Indonesia was a violation of humanity to be resisted.

Prominent figures of the community with the aspiration for integration with Indonesia had built up power to realise their ideals long before the coup in Portugal.

Due to historical sentiments which have grown strong among the people who regard themselves Indonesia, border lines have lost any meaning. Relations with the community of Indonesian Timor were close as they all felt that all tribes of Timor were part of the Indonesian people.

The aims of the struggle of Apodeti were not only manifested in its old name but also in its Political Manifesto of 27th May 1974, which stated among other things: Considering that in order to exercise that granted freedom, East Timor will chose concretely:

a. Integration into the Indonesian community.
b. The freedom of social justice.
c. Integration based on International Law with the status of an autonomous province.

The extent of its determination to struggle for the principle of integration into the Republic of Indonesia can be seen in its Statutes, particularly in Chapter II on Principles and Aims, Article 2 (Principles) which reads:

> The Apodeti Party is based on:
>
> - The belief in the One and Only God
> - Just and civilised humanity
> - Cultural and geneological unity, same history and fate
> - Deliberations among representatives
> - Social justice.

And Article 3 (Aims) which reads:

> The Apodeti Party aims at realising the ideal of Independence for the people of Portuguese Timor and at the integration into Indonesia, with a view to obtain welfare for the people of Portuguese Timor.

Meanwhile, the stance of Apodeti towards the three alternatives for the future of East Timor is as follows. The first alternative chosen as the aim of the struggle of UDT was to make East Timor a country with an extensive autonomy within a federation with Portugal or an independent one but within the Portuguese commonwealth. Apodeti firmly rejected such ideal as it was not in keeping with the aspiration of the people of East Timor and will not be

able to attain the main goal towards a just and properous society. This ideal regarded as dependence on Portugal was not realistic since Portugal was considered bankrupt as to be unable to provide a protective umbrella over East Timor.

The second alternative which constituted the aim of Fretilin was full independence from any country for East Timor. Apodeti also rejected it as the condition and situation of Portuguese Timor did not enable it to stand on its own feet as an independent and free country. This ideal was regarded as an illusion which if realised would make East Timor an arena of major power competitions which could make the people to suffer. In addition, it was not in keeping with the ideal of the people of East Timor who wanted to integrate into Indonesia, as geographically East Timor is part of Timor Island, one of the islands of the Nusantara Archipellago which since time immemorial constituted a geopolitical entity. The people of East Timor represent also one people with one regional language, which is the Tetum language. That is why family relationship continued, despite partition by colonial laws.

The third alternative which had become the aim of Apodeti was the integration of East Timor into the Indonesian Republic, which is called by Apodeti as a "Return to the Fatherland." At first, the two other parties rejected it, but later on UDT could accept. On the other hand, Fretilin continued to reject this third alternative. Consequently, there were only two alternatives for the future of East Timor.

THE POLICY OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

Portugal's policy of decolonisation, which opened opportunities for the struggle for independence in Portugal's colonies has generated protracted disturbances and civil wars in East Timor. Such a situation has drawn the attention of the Indonesian government to prevent the region from turning into a vulnerable one.

In facing the developments taking place in East Timor, Indonesia being a nation who upholds Pancasila as its ideal foundation, the 1945 Constitution as its structural basis, GBHN (Guidelines of State Policy) as its quide in determining its position and the direction of its actions, through the session of the Council for Political and National Security Stabilisation on 8th October 1974, President Soeharto officially declared Indonesia's "basic stance" on the East Timor problem as follows:

a. Indonesia does not have territorial ambitions;
b. It respects the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination;

c. Should the people of East Timor wish to join Indonesia, they can not do so as a state, but they will become part of the territory of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.

The decolonisation policy itself is applauded and is in conformity with the spirit as enunciated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution: "Whereas Independence is the natural right of every nation, colonialism must be abolished in this world because it is not in conformity with Humanity and Justice." For that reason, Indonesia could accept the decolonisation policy of Portugal. However, Indonesia would oppose if that decolonisation policy would only be a manifestation of the old form of colonialism in a new model of colonialism. Aside from that, to Indonesia the decolonisation process should not disturb the stability of the surrounding region (particularly Indonesia which was actively involved in development efforts). Hence the outcome of decolonisation should not make East Timor a vulnerable country, being an arena of major power competition, and a "trouble corner" which could put Indonesia in a difficult position.

Meanwhile the existing aspiration and sentiment among the people of East Timor of being one nation, having one fatherland and sharing similar ideals with the people of Indonesia continue to prevail and efforts to re-unite East Timor was in effect an endeavour to re-unite a separated part with the whole. In this context the first step taken was to approach both the colonial regime and the people of East Timor. In this regard the Governor/Head of the Nusa Tenggara Timur Province (at that time), El Tari, whose territory bordered on the territory of East Timor controlled by the Portuguese, played an important role. This policy was more effective as Portugal's economy being the main supporter of East Timor's economy deteriorated, while taxes collected from the people were insignificant. In addition, food production could never meet the needs of East Timor.

Such a situation made the colonial regime aware of the need for economic assistance from Indonesia and to open the political and economic isolation which was very tight before. Actually through his letter of 4th May 1974 addressed to Governor El Tari, the Governor of East Timor, Fernando Alves Aldeia, submitted a request for supplies of oil and wheat-flour which constituted the staple food of the people. In addition, in negotiations with Governor El Tari, the colonial administration of East Timor, also requested the orderly supply of cattle from NTT. And in the context of co-operation, it was jointly planned to open common markets in the border areas, in addition to co-operation in the field of meteorology, radio communications, regular sea communications, land communications by bus, and so on. In short, the visit of the NTT Governor to Dili on 28th February -- 2nd March 1974, succeeded in opening the isolation previously maintained by the Portuguese administration.

These good relations continued after the 25th April 1974 coup in Portugal. On 17th May 1974, the Governor of East Timor sent the Chief of Staff of the Portuguese army in East Timor, Major Arnao Matello, to see the Governor of NTT in Kupang and to brief him on the political changes which were taking place in Portugal. It was also explained that as a result of those changes the people of East Timor would be given the opportunity to democratically decide their own fate. The army in East Timor was to secure the holding of that election. In this connection the formation of UDT and ASDT political parties was mentioned, though there were as yet no concrete programmes.

Besides those two parties, which wanted a plebiscite for the people of East Timor to decide their fate and full independence for their country, there emerged a third party, namely AITI (Associacao Integracao de Timor-Indonesia) which desired to integrate with Indonesia. All three were organisations representing the aspirations of the people to participate in the referendum planned for March 1975.

At first the behaviour of all three parties to win the referendum was quite sportive and each moved in conformity with the rules of the game adopted, while the administration showed its ability to act as a stabiliser. Good relations with Indonesia were maintained. However, after Governor Fernando Alves Aldeia was replaced by a new Governor, Lieutenant Colonel Lemos Pires (an officer/member of the Movement), on 8th November 1974, great changes were taking place in the political situation in East Timor. Due to the interference of the authorities in the political parties, disatisfaction mounted among the parties which felt being unfairly treated. The competition between the parties became sharper and sportivity was gradually abandoned.

The situation became more insecure when the authorities came with a new plan to form a "Constituent Council" of 10 members, one from each party, while the seven others were practically monopolised by the authorities. Through this council the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) attempted to control and incite political disturbances in East Timor as they had done in Portugal through the Armed Forces Movement.

The plan which clearly deviated from the decolonisation process as outlined by the Lisbon Government was opposed by all three parties with their respective reasons. Apodeti opposed it arguing that the constituent council would be of no use, and it wanted a referendum. Fretilin opposed it as there would be an Apodeti representative in the council. Meanwhile, UDT accepted the council on the ground that representatives of political parties in the council would not be easily manipulated by the Portuguese government, in this case the AFM. The referendum plan which was later postponed to June 1975, was also abandoned. This means that the decolonisation process in East Timor was indecisive.

Facts showed that the disruption of the decolonisation process was caused by elements of the PCP who deliberatedly infiltrated East Timor by making use of the change in government. As they had strategic interests, the decolonisation must bring about a position for East Timor which was favourable to the strategies of leftists' movements. On that account they attempted to achieve the ability to direct the decolonisation process of East Timor, despite the fact that the process was oppossed to and deviated from outlines drawn by the Lisbon government.

From the outcome of the approaches and exploration carried out by an Indonesian delegation under Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo in medio October 1974, it became obvious that in the decolonisation process in East Timor the Lisbon government adopted this basic position:

1. To leave the future of East Timor fully to the aspirations of its people.
2. To be independent and on its own is for East Timor not realistic.
3. To be a state within a Portuguese federation is to negate the nature of Portugal's decolonisation policies.
4. Integration into the unitary state of the Indonesian Republic is the most realistic future status of East Timor.
5. To respect, to recognise and to give the opportunity to Indonesia to take part in moulding the future of East Timor.
6. To fully realise Indonesia's interests and position in the East Timor problem.

As this position of the Portuguese government would not be favourable to the strategies of leftists movements, PCP forced its presence in East Timor. That was the cause of the emerging situation as mentioned. In addition to efforts in removing the role of Indonesia, they made efforts to unite Fretilin and UDT in order to confront Apodeti. UDT however later realised that they were used solely as an instrument by the marxist authorities of East Timor. They also felt that the favoured Fretilin has shifted to the left and adopted a marxist course. For that reason the coalition of UDT with Fretilin could no longer be maintained. This awareness of UDT was explained by its chairman and vice chairman during their visit to Jakarta on 14th April 1974 made with a view to requesting for assistance to Indonesia.

THE APPROACH TO THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT

Being the government with the initiative of decolonisation, Portugal occupied a crucial position in the decolonisation process of its colonies. On account of that, steps were needed to approach and sound out the Portuguese

government in Lisbon. With that objective in view, President Soeharto through the Session of the Council for Political and National Security Stabilisation of 8th October 1974, has assigned the task to, Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo of carrying out an important mission i.e. to explain Indonesia's stance on the East Timor problem to the Portuguese government. In addition, Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo was given the task to convince the Portuguese government that Indonesia as well had interests in the future of East Timor in view of Indonesia's position. In granting the right to self-determination to the people of East Timor, the Portuguese government must act in such a way as to cause no disturbances to the stability of the region, which may eventually become a burden to itself.

Since at that time Indonesia's diplomatic relations with Portugal had been severed, prior to directly approaching Lisbon, General Ali Moertopo has assigned two liasion men for clearing the way to Lisbon, including arranging a meeting between General Ali Moertopo and top officials of the Portuguese government.

In the meantime, two weeks before that task of approaching the Portuguese government was carried out, precisely on 30th September 1974, President Spinola resigned and was succeeded by General da Costa Gomez. This means that there were changes in the political constellation of Portugal, namely the removal of the moderates and the increasing role of the radicals. In other words, with their prominent figure, Vasco Goncalves in the government as Prime Minister, the role of the AFM became greater. Nonetheless, that change did not alter the agenda of the visit of General Ali Moertopo's delegation as it was believed that some top government officials were to continue to occupy their crucial positions.

There were five prominent personalities in Portugal whom the Indonesian delegation under Ali Moertopo managed to sound out. They were respectively Prof. Campignos, Deputy Foreign Minister; Foreign Minister Mario Soares; President da Costa Gomez; Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves; and the Minister for Decolonisation Affairs. Basically the explanation by Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo to those five top officials of the Portuguese government was the same, namely Indonesia's stance on Portugals's decolonisation policies concerning East Timor, Indonesia's basic position, and finally Indonesia's view on the future of East Timor. General Ali Moertopo explained that Indonesia saw three alternatives for the future of East Timor as the outcome of decolonisation, that is being independent under the umbrella of Portugal; joining Indonesia; or being fully independent.

Among the three alternatives, the third one was, in Indonesia's judgement, the least possible, owing to two factors, i.e. first, the people of East Timor did

not yet have trained people to form a capable government; and second, they did not have adequate national resources to guarantee the existence of a free, independent and sovereign state. These two factors will give the opportunity to external power to enter the country with certain intentions, whether it be invited or not by East Timor. Should that happen, there would be instability in East Timor in particular and in Asia-Pacific in general. It was this prospect Indonesia was most concerned about.

On the other hand, should the decolonisation process through a referendum result in the wish of the people of East Timor to be independent under the protection of Portugal, Indonesia would have no objections there of and would respect it. However it would be natural should the referendum result in the wish to join Indonesia. It is in conformity with the historical and ethnic realities as well as with the policies proclaimed by Portugal itself, and is even something which would help create stability and security in the region in particular and in the world in general. Nevertheless, that integration should be carried out on the basis of the will of the people of East Timor and should not be contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, namely that it should be integrated as an autonomous province with a special status. In no way could it be done by way of independence or as an independent state so as to become a member state of a federation.

From the meetings of the Indonesian delegation with above mentioned officials of the Lisbon government one can draw the conclusion that the Portuguese government:

1. Was really serious in its decolonisation plan for East Timor, but had not found a clear-cut concept.
2. Could understand Indonesia's position and stance on the process of the decolonisation of East Timor.
3. Viewed the merger of East Timor with Indonesia as the best future for the people of East Timor themselves and for the stability of the surrounding region.
4. Was hoping for better co-operation between the Portuguese government and that of Indonesia as well as between the Indonesian government and that of East Timor.
5. Was even hoping for the speedy restoration of diplomatic relations between the governments of Portugal and Indonesia.
6. Appreciated very much the Indonesian government which was the first foreign government to have meetings with officials of the new Portuguese government.

Further, on the request of Portugal, in March 1975 the Indonesian government sent a delegation under Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo with the Indo-

nesian Ambassadors to France and the United Kingdom, respectively Lieutenant General A. Tahir and Admiral Soebono, and Drs. J. Halim as members to London, in order to meet and discuss the East Timor problem with a Portuguese delegation led by the Minister of State, Vitor Alves.

As the outcome of the London Meeting of 9th March 1975 it can be said briefly that Portugal still held the view that integration with Indonesia was the most reasonable and convenient way in the decolonisation process of East Timor. In addition, it was also obvious that the government of East Timor had difficulties in facing the Apodeti party and hence felt the need to hope for the help of Indonesia to make Apodeti to accept the idea of establishing a Consultative Body and be willing to be a member.

One very important conclusion one can draw from the London Meeting was a de facto recognition that Indonesia has an interest in the decolonisation process of East Timor, so that in every development of its process Indonesia is always to be considered, to be taken into account and to be involved. This means that in the development of that decolonisation process there were five inter-related decisive factors, namely the Portuguese government with its administration in East Timor, Fretilin, UDT, Apodeti, and Indonesia.

In implementing the agreement reached at the London Meeting, in that the parties should consult each other, at the beginning of April 1975 Indonesia sent a special team to East Timor (Dili).

During its stay in Dili, this team managed to have meetings with the Governor of East Timor, Colonel Lemos Pires, as well as with the leadership of Apodeti, UDT and Fretilin. Among the results of these soundings/meetings the following points can be listed:

1. In the field of the administration, Major De Mota, Cabinet Chief for Political Affairs (PCP member), played a crucial role. However, he did not as yet have a well defined political concept, and was still very much affected by people around him. Moreover, he did not have much influence in the Armed Forces circles.
2. Apodeti party displayed its firm and growing determination to integrate into Indonesia, precisely because there were heavy pressures on the part of the authorities and other parties. They even expressed their willingness to struggle with violence, when no better way could be used.
3. Fretilin was the only party possessing the ability in the field of organisation as well as in fighting tactics, due to the training by leftist ex-students who had arrived from Portugal specially for that purpose. Among them who were still in East Timor at that time was Antonio Carvario. Although in the talks with the team of delegates, Fretilin always tried to evade questions

and to cover its identity, the structure and system of its organisation as well as the tactics of its struggle however clearly showed that Fretilin was communist or at least was controlled by communists. Its hatred towards Indonesia was very striking, perhaps owing to the Indonesian government's attitude in banning the communist ideology in Indonesia.

4. On the other hand, UDT began showing their understanding and appreciation of Indonesia's attitude which desired very much that national security was not to be disturbed and stability attained in the region. Furthermore, appreciation was shown for Indonesia's attitude towards communism.
5. The conviction of Fretilin and UDT that over five to eight years Portugal would be able to develop East Timor in keeping with its decolonisation concept was still strong.

In the meantime, while attending the Session of the UN General Assembly at the end of 1974, Foreign Minister Adam Malik had the opportunity to hold a meeting with Portugal's Foreign Minister Mario Soares in New York on 21st September 1974. The outcome of their talks was among other things that both were prepared to co-operate on the East Timor problem, particularly with regard to efforts of self determination. For that end they needed to consult each other. They also urged that diplomatic relations be restored soon in order to facilitate co-operation and consultation.

A follow-up to this meeting and encouraged by the results of the talks of General Ali Moertopo with top officials in Lisbon, the Portuguese government sent the Minister for Overseas Territories, Dr. Antonio de Almeida Santos, to Indonesia in order to have talks with the Indonesian government on the decolonisation problem of East Timor. In his press statement on his arrival in Jakarta on 16th October 1974, Dr. Santos again stated the position of the Portuguese government on the East Timor problem which was basically the same as presented above. On the other hand, when he met with President Soeharto and Foreign Minister Adam Malik, the Indonesian side stated the same position as before.

Minister Almeida Santos who continued his journey to East Timor, said in Dili on 20th October 1974 that there would be no referendum soon in East Timor. The people of East Timor would beforehand elect their representatives to the Constituent Council and it was this council that would afterwards decide on the general election. He also said that independence for East Timor at that time would not be realistic.

Further, on 27th December 1974, Minister Almeida Santos sent a memo to the Secretary General of the UN, the Committee of 24, and also to the UN Emergency Operation, which basically stated:

1. The people of East Timor wished to stay united with Portugal.
2. Portugal agreed to the independence of East Timor if it was so wished by the majority of the people.
3. The UN was requested to grant aid to the amount of US$7.5 million in order to overcome femine in East Timor.
4. Indonesia and Australia would be very sensitive should disturbances erupt in East Timor.

Strangely enough, in that memo was not mentioned the possibility of the integration of East Timor into Indonesia, which was discussed before in talks between Indonesia and Portugal as well as in the statements on their respective basic positions.

Meanwhile, on the basis of the outcome of the mission of General Ali Moertopo to Lisbon in medio October 1974 and the outcome of negotiations between Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Dr. Santos in Jakarta in the same month, Indonesia began making preparations for the restoration of diplomatic relations with Portugal (these relations were broken off in 1964 when the non-aligned countries acted jointly to isolate colonial powers (including Portugal) which did not display any tolerance towards the freedom struggle of colonies). As a follow-up, on 10th May 1975, President Soeharto decided to appoint Drs. Ben Mang Reng Say Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia to Portugal with his seat in Lisbon. Unfortunately, these relations were again broken off on 7th December 1975, when Dili fell in the hands of a joint force, which in Portugal's judgement was the result of an Indonesian military invasion.

TURBULENCE IN EAST TIMOR

As expounded above, after the succession of the Governor in November 1974, a change took place in the political situation in East Timor. The rivalries between the three parties became fiercer, particularly owing to interference by the authorities who seemed to side with a particular party. Governor Lemos Pires, who was an officer of the AFM belonging to the moderate group and politically oriented to the socialists, tended to favour UDT in his policies. On the other hand, the stance and actions of his aids, who were mostly members of the PCP, tended to favour Fretilin. Meanwhile, some Apodeti figures obtained full support from Major Arnao Matello, Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces in East Timor, who was also known as a PCP prominent. Owing to this situation the position of Apodeti having an aspiration for integration with the Republic of Indonesia, became more difficult, the more so as some policies and actions of the authorities were putting pressures on the position of Apodeti members having such an aspiration.

Disagreement among the authorities of East Timor was also reflected in their policies/concepts on the decolonisation of East Timor which were at variance with those outlined by the Portuguese government in Lisbon. This situation in disarray was aggravated by the establishment of a Commission of Timorese Sergeants (native Timorese) on 11th January 1975. This Commission which was dominated by sergeants supporters of Fretilin was the outcome of a new plan of pro Fretilin and UDT sergeants, after they failed to form a new party due to opposition by pro Apodeti sergeants.

Starting from the formation of that Commission, on 20th January 1975 Fretilin and UDT formed a coalition and issued a joint communique signed by the chairmen of Fretilin's Central Committee, Francisco Xavier do Amaral and the UDT Chairman, Francisco Lopez da Cruz. The basic points of this joint communique were as follows:

1. Total independence for the people of East Timor or Dili Timor.
2. To repudiate Apodeti as it defends the idea of integration with a neo-colonialist which is against the real interests of the people of East Timor and the UN Charter.
3. To recognise Portugal as the only legitimate executive in the process of decolonisation, and to adopt Portuguese as the official language of Dili Timor or East Timor.
4. To resort to the UN to support Portugal in the process of decolonisation with the view of national independence for the people of Eastern Timor or Dili Timor.
5. The coalition reserves the right to select which countries may participate in the supervisory commission, and to reject the great powers, ASEAN and other countries influenced by Indonesia and Australia.
6. To establish a transitional government through negotiations in Lisbon between the Portuguese government, Fretilin and UDT.
7. To establish an "ad hoc" committee with equal representatives from both coalition parties for the supervision of radio programmes and lectures for publication through the information media.
8. No ideological aggression and mutual respect for programmes and forms of ideology.
9. Portuguese Timor will be called East Timor and its citizens Timorese.

With the formation of the Commission of Timorese Sergeants and the Fretilin-UDT coalition, for the time being the offensive against the Apodeti potential and elements of pro integration with Indonesia appeared to be more effective. However, as the formation of mentioned Commission and coalition was actually enforced upon them and was not for the sake of the struggle, therefore in a relative short time those two bodies were moving towards fragmentation.

In the meantime, through Dili radio, UDT and Fretilin were launching discrediting and hostile issues addressed to Indonesia. It turned out that this was done so in preparation for a plan to seize power in East Timor since the outcome of the meeting in Lisbon at the end of 1974 and of that in London in March 1975 had shown that Portugal was inclined to accommodate the aspiration for integration with Indonesia. In addition, the campaign was also meant to break the fighting spirit of Apodeti, and at the same time to explore to what extent Indonesia could restrain itself and to keep up to its stance.

A split between Fretilin and UDT could eventually not be avoided. This could be forecasted before as the political views of those two parties were fundamentally different. UDT adopted political patterns which had a conservative-moderate tune and were oriented towards De Spinola's decolonisation policy. Fretilin, on the other hand, adopted extreme leftist political patterns as they were affected by cadres from the MRPP (Movimento Revolucionario do Proletariado Portugues -- Revolutionary Movement of the Portuguese Proletariate) as well as from PCP.

UDT finally realised that its coalition with Fretilin was a trap set for them. Moreover Fretilin seemed to move further to the left. And on 27th May 1975 UDT issued an official communique on its separation from Fretilin. The reason was among others that Fretilin was increasingly controlled by communists and its modes of struggle were endangering the interests of the people of East Timor. Within the context of its struggle against communism, UDT later approached Apodeti and appealed for help to Indonesia in the form of cadre training in order to contain communism and financial assistance to enable them to make contacts with ASEAN countries, Taiwan and Australia.

While the political temperature in East Timor rose higher and higher, above all because the relations between Apodeti and Fretilin has become increasingly hostile, a meeting was held in Macao from 26th to 28th June 1975 between the Portuguese government, Apodeti and UDT. As explained at the London Meeting, the aim of this Macao meeting was to form a Consultative Body where representatives of the three parties would get a seat. As Fretilin did not wish to attend it arguing that it did not wish to sit at the same table with Apodeti who were regarded as a puppet for wanting to integrate with Indonesia, the meeting changed in form to become a mere hearing between the parties present and the Portuguese government. In this connection, in conformity with what was expected by the Portuguese Government in London, Indonesia also sent a high level delegation to Hong Kong in order to monitor the course of the meeting and to communicate its views when asked by the Portuguese government.

The positive outcome of the Macao Meeting was regarded as the one that made the decolonisation process of East Timor to be more certain in that a

decision was made that a referendum was to be held in October 1976; and that Portugal was to leave East Timor in October 1978. In addition, in order to hold the referendum it was decided to form a Governing Body, a kind of managing body for the territory of East Timor.

The results achieved at that meeting, despite the change in its form, were viewed by the participants as quite satisfying to the three sides. Both Apodeti and UDT felt that the aspirations of their parties were successfully included and accommodated in the draft of the decolonisation project of East Timor to be decided by the Portuguese government.

Based on the results of the Macao meeting, a draft constitution approved by the military Revolutionary Council of Portugal and published on 12th June 1975, stated among other things that East Timor was to remain Portuguese territory up to October 1978. It provides for the establishment of a People's Assembly to be elected in a general election in 1976. Its task was to determine the policies and administration of the territory. A Portuguese High Commission was to direct and head the administration to be established with five members as executive secretaries to be appointed by Portugal. Three portofolio were to be given to the three political parties in East Timor, i.e. Apodeti, UDT and Fretilin. The important positions those of the Departments of Justice and Domestic Affairs, Finance and Economic Affairs will be held by Portugal, while less important positions, such as the Department of Culture and Education, Labour and Social Affairs, Environment and Infrastructure were to be given to the three parties.

Meanwhile, the break-up of the UDT-Fretilin coalition did not mean that pressures they exercised on Apodeti were reduced. On the contrary, those pressures were even stepped up by arresting some Apodeti members. Even the King of Atsabe, a prominent Apodeti figure whose influence was very great in Atsabe and the surrounding region where all people were Apodeti members, was almost captured by Fretilin, but could be rescued by an UDT group sent from Maliana by Joao Tavares, the UDT representative in Maliana.

On 11th August 1975, UDT carried out a kind of seizure of power called the 11th August Revolutionary Movement. All important points in Dili were occupied and controlled. This offensive was launched by UDT with the help of some pro UDT government leaders. At the same time UDT demanded among other things that the government take firm steps immediately to expel from East Timor all communists and others with similar leanings; to maintain Lemos Pires as Governor of East Timor; to carry out genuine decolonisation in line with the Lei Constitutional No. 7/1979 the bill of which was approved in Macao by UDT and Apodeti.

And on 13th August 1975, UDT issued a communique to the public to ex-

plain the aim of the movement. It stated among other things that the 11th August Movement was a flash of the conscience of the people of East Timor who for such a long time had been yearning for independence and self government by the people. In this regard the people of East Timor should know that it is UDT who wish to head the government. The communique also called for unity needed to confront the reactionaries. And called on the Armed Forces to unite with UDT.

During the first week, UDT seemed to be still strong enough to occupy important positions and to control some areas. Fretilin, Apodeti, the government as well as the military did at first nothing at all. Fretilin who were in a process of consolidating its power soon started to give resistance. Several prominent Apodeti figures together with Fretilin launched an armed resistance against UDT in Dili.

In facing the deteriorating situation in East Timor, on 23rd August 1975 (and again on 25th August) Portugal asked Indonesia to help in the evacuation of Portuguese citizens and others by dispatching ships to East Timor. On the basis of this request, Indonesia dispatched a delegation led by Colonel Soebiyakto, aboard the KRI Mongonsidi which arrived in Dili on 27th August 1975. Colonel Soebiyakto conducted negotiations with leaders of the three parties in conflict, and an extraordinary result was achieved, in that the three parties agreed to a cease-fire for 4 days to make the evacuation possible. Thereafter KRI Mongonsidi left Dili waters and took position four miles off the coast.

The result of those negotiations could actually be used by Governor Lemos Pires to arrange a cease fire and to control the whole situation. However, he did not do so and actually made preparations for his evacuation to Atauro Island. And he took precisely the wrong step by ordering the KRI Mongonsidi to leave Dili though it was regretted by the Australian government who considered that the country being able to bring about peace was Indonesia.

The control of the situation in East Timor by UDT could not last long. Only one week after the 11th August 1975 Movement the situation was reversed. Fretilin began moving and made efforts to seize strategic positions in several areas. Fretilin could do so as a Fretilin leader, Rogerio Lobato, was appointed by Lemos Pires Commander of the Armed Forces in East Timor who possessed 27.000 fire arms. Accordingly the people's armed forces supported Fretilin. Moreover, Fretilin exploited the weakness of UDT whose strength only relied on the positions of important officials. On the other hand, the controling power of the military being the important and decisive factor were not given enough attention to though part of the military were on UDT side.

It can be said that the UDT offensive was not sufficiently backed by good planning, so that after achieving success they were bewildered not knowing what to do. For that reason it is not suprising that Fretilin could launch a rapid offensive in all areas and succeeded in seizing them. The evacuation of Governor Lemos Pires and the moving of the government to Atauro on 27th August, 1975 meant that UDT could no longer hope to beat Fretilin and also signaled the beginning of the end of the de facto power of the Portuguese government in East Timor. It also means that Portugal washed its hands and relinquished its responsibility as the East Timor authority. Accordingly Portugal no longer has moral right to retain East Timor.

After 26th August 1975, Fretilin gradually controlled part of Dili, including the airport. In Dili and surrounding area Apodeti troops appeared to co-operate with Fretilin to resist UDT in a counter-coup that began on 20th August 1975. Later supporters of Apodeti were captured by Fretilin. Towards September 1975, the trust of the people and political parties of East Timor towards Portuguese authority over East Timor had disappeared totally. Meanwhile, the leaders of Apodeti and the 11th August 1975 Movement endeavoured to approach Indonesian posts to request arms from Indonesia in order to confront Fretilin whose movement was spreading.

The offensive of Fretilin launched at the end of August 1975, in only one month succeeded in controlling almost the whole territory of East Timor, though some base areas of UDT were still able to hold out. At the end of September 1975 practically the whole territory of East Timor was under the control of Fretilin. However, behind that success, ignoring the rules of international relations, Fretilin feeling very strong, often violated Indonesia territory by firing artilery shells into it as well as by plundering cattle and food. Moreover, Indonesian troops patrolling the border had several times fire contacts with Fretilin troops on Indonesian territory, while the people were terrorised and fled to the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. ICRC estimated that the number of refugees totalled about 45.000 people.

Meanwhile, in preparation for the proclamation of independence and the establishment of a state to be called the "Democratic State of East Timor," on 7th October 1975 a meeting was held between the Central Committee of Fretilin with Falintil (Fretilin Armed Forces). The result of this meeting was the drawing of an organisational structure of a state, including that of an executive apparatus. However, in order not to be too obvious and not to invite reactions from outside which could weaken its diplomatic struggle, Fretilin stated that the form of that organisation was the organisational structure of Fretilin's party.

Further, on 13th October 1975, Fretilin leader Xavier do Amaral installed the Administrator of a Provisional Government of East Timor and a Commission for Economic Affairs. With regard to the control of the territory, at the end of September 1975, another announcement was also made concerning the structure of the division of the defence territory for the whole of East Timor, including its personnel and the division of their tasks.

In the meantime, Apodeti who was militarily the weakest party and never hoped to win by armed strength had in effect the strongest position to face the power struggle which was crucial for winning the referendum. The source of Apodeti strength was the motivation of its struggle which was based on ethnological, geographical and historical realities and which could easily be understood and be lived up by the people. And being convinced to win in the referendum, Apodeti directed its movement on fostering understanding with the people, while a built-up of armed physical strength was neglected. UDT and Fretilin, on the other hand, realising that it would be very difficult to win the referendum, directed their movement on the building-up of physical power.

To Apodeti, the occurence of military movements was a surprise and heavy blow as well. They must however willy-nilly take part in it. And only owing to its skill in exploiting the situation, Apodeti could play a role in the turbulence in East Timor. In Dili for instance, Apodeti took a neutral stance, while around Dili it co-operated with Fretilin to encircle UDT who was in control of Dili. On the other hand, in several areas Apodeti actually co-operated with UDT to confront Fretilin. In this way, Fretilin was able to collect weapons, and even to split its enemies, and managed to draw moderate groups from both parties to join them. However, all that was not without sacrifices. Moreover, the exploitation of the situation was not accompanied by follow-up actions. The outcome was that when Fretilin succeeded in controlling Dili, almost all its leaders were captured by Fretilin, except the King of Atsabe, Maria Guilherme Goncalves and his son with their men who succeeded in fleeing to the border.

Meanwhile, on 1st September 1975, several among UDT district leaders prepared a text proclaiming their integration with Indonesia.

Due to pressures by these UDT district leaders, on the same date, on 1st September 1975, the Chairman of UDT, Lopez da Cruz, met with Indonesian officials at the Indonesian border post of Motaain. In addition to explaining the general situation in East Timor, above all the Fretilin Movement, the UDT Chairman related that UDT had found a Fretilin document in Bukole showing that there had been cooperation between Fretilin and former PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) members. And that in the use of heavy weapons, Fretilin

was assisted by external elements. Lopez also conveyed the desire of a part of the UDT district leaders to proclaim soon the integration with Indonesia. However, that matter needed to be discussed first with other areas. With a view to that, he requested for a small plane and pilot from Indonesia in order to contact those areas. Moreover, he asked for medicines, physicians, food, and heavy weapons, mortars and machine guns from Indonesia.

On 2nd September 1975, UDT Chairman, Lopez da Cruz came for a second time to Motaain to meet with Indonesian officials with almost the same intention, particularly with regard to the wish of the people that the integration with Indonesia be proclaimed soon. Further, in order to bolster those integration efforts, at the end of September 1975, Lopez da Cruz issued a political statement addressed to the Indonesian Ambassador in Canberra, Tokyo and Bangkok, the Indonesian Consul General in Hong Kong, the Representative of the Indonesian Kadin (Chamber of Commerce and Industry) in Taiwan, the Minister of Defence and International Security of Malaysia, and the Directorate for European Affairs of the Foreign Department of Taiwan. Its main point was the problem of integration with Indonesia. It was stated that order and security in East Timor had been destroyed by the war waged by Fretilin. Atrocities and massacres had been perpetrated by Fretilin among the people causing them to suffer. UDT had already issued a statement on integration with Indonesia. This means that from then on UDT was not only friendly or brotherly to the people of Indonesia, but also constituted one family or community under the protection of one flag, the Red and White Flag. In this respect, UDT felt the need to and wanted to continue and foster that relationship in order to make it stronger.

Meanwhile, UDT Chairman, Lopez da Cruz stated in an interview with the German Television that his aim at that moment was to integrate with Indonesia. And being a Democratic Party UDT must follow the voice and the wish of the majority of the people.

On 24th September 1975, after the return of the special mission of Dr. Santos who had held a meeting with the Indonesian government in Jakarta on 29th August-1st September and on 11th-12th September 1974, the Portuguese government proposed a new policy for solving the East Timor problem by inviting the leaders of the three parties in conflict in East Timor to attend a meeting. This proposal however did not obtain a positive response from UDT and Apodeti as the time was in their view not appropriate, the more so as they were losing in the field, so that they, should there be negotiations, would be easily forced to accept the concept of the winning party. In addition, the absence of a response on their part was above all due to the fact that Portugal did no longer have any power to uphold its authority in East Timor.

While the turbulance continued, there emerged another problem which was serious enough and difficult to deal with, namely the problem of refugees. Since the launching of the 11th August Movement by UDT, the stream of refugees from East Timor had been increasing in numbers. A major part of those refugees entered Indonesian territory seeking protection for their safety from the atrocities of the civil war which was out of control, in particular from the threats of Fretilin who acted increasingly brutally. The number of refugees reached 45,000. In order to help those refugees, Indonesia must provide funds to the amount of Rp 6 billion per day.

Meanwhile, the development of the turbulance increasingly showed that armed power could speak better in the struggle than honesty to observe the rules of the struggle. This has spurred Apodeti to also speak with armed power in the battlefield. The consolidation of members must be stepped up and efforts to obtain arms be intensified in order to counter the raging power of Fretilin. With that objective in view, several Apodeti leaders invited UDT to continue the struggle by siding with Apodeti who supported the aspiration of the people of East Timor to join Indonesia.

Those efforts were seemingly successful, so that from the beginning of September 1975 onwards many UDT district leaders endeavoured to enter Indonesian territory to state their hope to be able to join Indonesia. Even the commander of the UDT troops, Joao Carrascalao (who afterward fled to Portugal), appealed to Indonesia to launch a military offensive soon in order to settle the East Timor problem. However, as explained above, this request could not be granted as Indonesia kept its basic stance. For that reason, in order to achieve their aim, they must continue their struggle and join forces with Apodeti and other elements, such as the Kota and Trabalista parties.

With regard to the Kota party, its former name was APMT (Associacao Popular Monarquica Timorense - Timorese Monarchical Popular Association), which was formed on 8th November 1974 but not recognised by the government of East Timor as it was unable to prove the number of its supporters. Previously APMT could not develop, but after it had become Kota party (Klibur Oan Timor Aswain-Association of the Society of Timorese Heroes) and the admission of a new member as its motor, namely Jose Martins (who afterwards changed his mind and went over to Fretilin as he was dissatisfied with his position in PSTT (Provisional Government of East Timor), mentioned party appeared to be more productive and succeeded in making itself one of the important elements within the anti-Fretilin power constellation.

The aim of forming Kota was to seek support among native elements and to maintain the identity of Timor. According to its leader, Jose Martins, Kota

constituted a struggle partner of Apodeti to counter Fretilin. Trabalista on the other hand, was previously only a labour movement, which developed to become a party.

It was from that determination that a joint force was formed afterwards, consisting of elements of UDT, Apodeti, Kota and Trabalista. It was their offensive that succeeded later to frustrate Fretilin troops. In order to bolster this joint force, young refugees who were in Indonesian territory were mobilised. They were tackled directly by the commander of each party.

In order to have a base for their offensive, on 6th October 1975 that joint force seized Batugede, which was used as a concentration point for Fretilin troops. Concurrently with the fall of Batugede, in several other places the joint force who had been smuggled in, began an offensive that startled Fretilin. On 16th October 1975, the joint force succeeded in seizing Balibo. Further, areas occupied by Fretilin were recovered one by one, including former Apodeti and UDT bases.

On the other hand, Fretilin began losing its line of struggle, particularly when Dili was surrounded by enemies. Nonetheless, on 28th November 1975, Fretilin's Central Committee was still able to force itself in Dili to unilaterally proclaim the establishment of a state they called the Democratic Republic of East Timor, and to appoint Xavier do Amaral as President.

The reaction of the Indonesian government to the unilateral proclamation of Fretilin was reflected in a statement read by Information Minister Mashuri on 29th November 1975 which among other things stated:

1. Indonesia deplores the unilateral action of Fretilin which was opposed to the efforts made continuously by the Indonesian government toward the achievement of self-determination by the people of East Timor through negotiations as agreed to by the three parties in Portuguese Timor, the Portuguese government and the Indonesian government as well.
2. Indonesia deplores the stance of the Portuguese government as conveyed by the Portuguese Minister for Co-operation, Victor Crespo, to the Indonesian Ambassador in Lisbon, Beng Mang Reng Say, on 28th November 1975 which justified the action of Fretilin.
3. Indonesia remains convinced that the future of East Timor should be decided by the whole people of East Timor themselves. And Indonesia cannot tolerate a situation in East Timor that could endanger stability in this region.

In this regard, the position of the Australian government on the unilateral

proclamation of Fretilin was reflected in a statement by Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock on 29th November 1975 to the effect that among other things the Australian government does not recognise Fretilin's unilateral proclamation of Independence and continues to endorse a peaceful settlement. Australia is willing to host such negotiations.

Compared with other neighbouring countries, Australia showed a great deal of attention to the East Timor problem. Since the emergence of this problem, Australia has adopted a stance which upheld the principle of self-determination for the people of East Timor and accepted every decision taken by them. Nonetheless, it also saw the interest of regional stability which has become a matter of principle for Indonesia as well. For that reason, every step by Indonesia to face the East Timor problem always received the attention and scrutiny of the Australian Government.

However, being a country which adheres to liberal democracy, the Australian government found it difficult to restrict such movements, like CIET (Campaign for Independence East Timor -- established at the beginning of November 1974 by prominent figures assembled in the organisation of AICD (Australian Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament) which since the establishment of the New Order government have often made efforts to undermine the Indonesian government which was supporting Fretilin, though basically that movement may cause strained relations between Australia and Indonesia. This condition was seriously used by CIEF and Fretilin, so that in its development Australia constituted a home base for the Fretilin movement to fight other movements in East Timor wishing to integrate with Indonesia.

Meanwhile, on 2nd December 1975, Fretilin announced the composition of "its cabinet" which was actually only pro forma, as at that time what was called the Democratic Republic of East Timor had practically no territory. Indeed, there were practically no people left to look after.

On the other hand, the joint movement of Apodeti, UDT, Kota and Trabalista responded to the challenge of that unilateral proclamation by Fretilin with a counter proclamation, which among other things stated: On this day, 30th November 1975, in the town of Balibo, the Apodeti, UDT, Kota and Trabalista parties proclaim the territory of East Timor as part of Indonesia and do not recognise the unilateral proclamation of independence of the territory by Fretilin (this proclamation was actually done on 29th November 1975, but signed only on 30th November 1975).

On 3rd December 1975, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, handed the statement of those four parties to President Soeharto. Further, on 4th December

1975, the Indonesian government issued a statement on its position on the latest development in East Timor, which stated among other things:

- Indonesia continues to support Portugal's decolonisation policies which must be implemented in an appropriate, orderly and peaceful way;
- It deplores the unilateral action of Fretilin declaring the independence of East Timor without taking into account the other parties who are also representing the people;
- It respects the rights of, sympathises with and most profoundly understands the proclamation by UDT, Apodeti, Kota and Trabalista parties, who on behalf of the People of Portuguese Timor proclaim integration into the Republic of Indonesia;
- All parties concerned in East Timor should seriously endeavour to achieve the implementation of decolonisation in an appropriate, orderly and peaceful manner;
- It will take steps required to guarantee the security of its national territory, to guard the sovereignty of the state and to protect its people against disturbances from outside and on the basis of anti-colonialism and humanity principles the government and people of Indonesia have a moral obligation to protect the rights of the people of the territory of East Timor so that the process of decolonisation be implemented in conformity with the ideals and desire of the whole people of East Timor;
- It calls on the whole people of Indonesia in general and the people who border the territory of Portuguese Timor in particular to increase their vigilance.

It needs to be known, that before the development of the East Timor problem had evolved into above mentioned situation, negotiations for its settlement were still going on. Among others was the Rome Meeting on 1st - 2nd November 1975 between an Indonesian delegation under Foreign Minister Adam Malik and a Portuguese delegation under Foreign Minister Major Melo Antunes. This meeting was held on the request of Portugal, who apparently realised its inability to settle the East Timor problem on its own. This meeting achieved an agreement among other things on the following points:

- continued recognition of Portugal's authority on the territory;
- the need to achieve a cease fire soon between the parties in conflict;
- the immediate return of 56,000 East Timorese refugees who are in Indonesian territory;
- with regard to the problem of 23 Portuguese citizens held by UDT, Portugal requests for the services of Indonesia for their release.

However, the Rome Meeting merely constituted a sounding of and a confirmation of the stance and position of the respective parties, who apparently could understand each other. Among other things, as included in the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 3rd November 1975:

- The Indonesian government agrees and will help the implementation of the new plan of the Portuguese government to bring the parties in conflict closer to each other in order to seek a peaceful solution;
- The Portuguese government is not prepared to invite Indonesia to participate militarily in the effort to restore security and order for reasons it calls a matter of principle;
- The Portuguese government is of the opinion that Indonesia is one of the most interested parties in the East Timor problem and will continuously consult and co-operate in every effort and in every stage in the decolonisation process of mentioned country;
- The Portuguese government has no intention to internationalise the East Timor problem.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF EAST TIMOR (PSTT)

Exuberant ardor represented the main asset of the joint force of Apodeti, UDT, Kota and Trabalista since they launched their offensive that could not be halted by Fretilin. They succeeded in seizing towns and areas one by one, so that eventually on 7th December 1975, that joint force, backed by Indonesian volunteers, succeeded in occupying and controlling Dili. The road to Dili was wide open owing to divisions occurring within Fretilin as a result of disarmament on the part of the civilians with the 28th November 1975 proclaimed by the military. This has caused many Fretilin troops to abandon their units and to join the joint force.

Due to the fall of Dili Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia as Indonesia was considered having invaded East Timor.

A day after the fall of Dili, the Indonesian government issued a statement explaining its stance on that new development, as follows:

a. The Indonesian government continues to support the decolonisation of East Timor through an appropriate, orderly and peaceful process.
b. The unending turbulence in East Timor has disturbed the stability in Indonesia in particular and in Southeast Asia in general.
c. For that reason the solution of the East Timor problem is in no way a matter of territorial ambitions on the part of Indonesia.

d. Indonesia fully understands the will of the people of East Timor, having been colonised for 400 years by Portugal, to be independent.
e. She very much deplores the decision of the Portuguese government to break off diplomatic relations with the Indonesian government.
f. As a result of the development of the situation in Portuguese Timor, the Rome Memorandum could practically not be implemented. As such, the appropriate, orderly and peaceful process of decolonisation would be more difficult to carry out.
g. Due to increasingly terrible battles, the number of innocent victims has increased. With that development in view, the Indonesian government is facing the only option not to check the desire of volunteers to help their brothers to free themselves from colonial suppression and terror by Fretilin.
h. The presence of Indonesian volunteers in the territory of Portuguese Timor is based among other things on these considerations:
   - Pressures of the Indonesian people through the 6th December 1975 statement of the DPR (House of Representatives of Indonesia) urging the government to take firm and concrete actions in settling the problem of Portuguese Timor.
   - A request by the four parties of East Timor as contained in the Declaration of Integration of the people of Portuguese Timor with the Republic of Indonesia of 30th November 1975.

A clarification as mentioned above, in particular relating to the presence of Indonesian volunteers in Portuguese Timor, was also issued on 10th December 1975 to explain the problematic to the international community.

In the meantime, on 12th December 1975, in a solemn and moving ceremony in the NTT Level-I DPRD (The East Nusa Tenggara Regional Representative Council) in Kupang, the former Portuguese enclave of Oekusi declared to join the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and thereby the whole of its people becoming Indonesian citizens. Acting on behalf of the people of Oekusi were: Oekusi Administrator, Jaime dos Remedios de Oliveira; the military commander of Oekusi, Jose Valentes; the local secretary of Apodeti, Joao Martins Corbafo; the local secretary of UDT, Joao Maniquin; and the local secretary of Fretilin, Sebastiao de Almeida. This declaration was cordially accepted by NTT Governor, El Tari, who promised to convey it to the Central Government in Jakarta for further settlement.

On 17th December 1975, Apodeti, UDT, Kota and Trabalista, on behalf of the whole of the people of East Timor, declared the establishment of a Provinsional Government of East Timor (PSTT), in order to guarantee the smooth running of the government, the administration, law and security so that the

normal life of the people of East Timor could be restored. This declaration was signed by UDT leader, Francisco Xavier Lopez da Cruz.

Meanwhile, certain prominent figures in Portugal with more realistic views on the problem of East Timor, such as General Antonio Remalho Eanes (afterwards elected President), through the Portuguese Ambassador in New York, succeeded in contacting a PSTT delegation who was there at the time and proposed to hold talks with the PSTT in Dili concerning 23 detainees held by PSTT. He was satisfied with the increasingly stable situation in East Timor and felt that the existence of the PSTT was real and able to control the situation.

Further, the two sides held negotiations in Bangkok on 6-10th July 1976. These negotiations eventually managed to formulate a memorandum which among other things noted Portugal's willingness to pay the salaries of its civil servants not yet paid, counted as from August 1975 up to the moment of the juridical integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia, and to continue the financing of on going projects.

As the objective was not yet achieved, Portugal's new President, General Antonio Remalho Eanes, again sent his special envoy, General Morais da Silva to hold negotiations with PSTT in Bangkok on 25th July 1976. The result of these negotiations was among other things that the PSTT agreed to surrender 23 Portuguese military men held as prisoners (carried out on 27th July 1976 through the Indonesian Red Cross, together with other Portuguese refugees); Morais da Silva accepted the integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia. However, according to the latest developments in Portugal itself various views on the East Timor issue emerged.

EAST TIMOR THE 27TH PROVINCE

The Balibo Proclamation of 30th November 1975 constituted a source and base of a new legal order enforced by the joint movement of Apodeti, UDT, Kota and Trabalista. It was therefore a logical consequence that the joint movement, starting from that proclamation, has formed a Provisional Government of East Timor (PSTT) on 17th December 1975 and afterwards the East Timor Regional Representative Council (DPRD) on the basis of Act. No. 1/AD/1976.

Those two high state institutions were deliberately established in order to complement the executive apparatus and the provision of an organ for the accommodation of the will of the people in an objective way. Consequently, In-

donesia's demand that the will of the people should in the first place be legalised could be met and at the same time this also means meeting the demands of the rules of international politics, that the determination of the future of East Timor be based on the will of the people of that territory themselves.

On 31st May 1976, the East Timor Regional Council of Representatives which was elected in conformity with the principles of traditional democracy which in a special way followed the customs of East Timor, held an open plennary session to determine the future of East Timor. The session, chaired by Speaker Guilherme Maria Goncalves, was attended by all 30 members (representing 13 districts and the capital), the invitees, namely Chief Executive Arnaldo Dos Reis Araujo and his Deputy, Lopez da Cruz, the representatives of friendly countries, and foreign journalists.

That open plenary session of the DPRD, convened with the sole agenda to discuss the integration of East Timor with the Republic of Indonesia, succeeded in issuing a decision which was unanimously accepted, i.e. a petition to urge the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to implement the integration of the territory of East Timor into the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

With a view to implementing that decision of the plenary session of the DPRD, on 5th June 1976, a large delegation of the people of East Timor, consisting of 41 people led by the Chief Executives of the SPTT, Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, arrived in Jakarta in order to hand over the Petition of the People of East Timor to integrate with Indonesia. Further, on 7th June 1976, the delegation met with President Soeharto at the Merdeka Palace to hand over the petition. On that occasion, the President stated that he would send a team consisting of members of the government and the DPR (House of Representatives) and various social organisations to once again ascertain the will and wish of the people of East Timor before that territory officially joins the Republic of Indonesia. This was done so not because the Indonesian government did not believe in the Balibo Proclamation, or in the petition received, or was in doubt about the leaders of East Timor, but with a view to enabling the people of Indonesia to see for themselves and to speak heart to heart with their brothers in East Timor.

And on 24th June 1976, the delegation of the Indonesian government, numbering 36 people including 9 from the DPR and respectively 1 from KNPI (National Committee of Indonesian Youth), HKTI (Association of the Family of Indonesian Farmers), PBFI (The All Indonesia Federation of Labour), HNSI (The All Indonesia Association of Fishermen) and PGRI (Association of Indonesian Teachers) and led by Minister of Home Affairs, Amir

machmud, arrived in Dili to see and to get a direct picture of the true facts relating to the will of the people of East Timor to join the people of Indonesia within the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. On the same day, the delegation, accompanied by several foreign representatives and journalists, was able to complete its task in a satisfactory manner and to return to Jakarta.

Further, during the Plenary Cabinet Session of 29th June 1976 chaired by President Soeharto, after hearing the report of the Chairman of the Delegation to East Timor, he came to the conclusion that the Petition of the PSTT/DPRD of East Timor he received on 7th June 1976 from the delegation of the people of East Timor has truly reflected the will of the people of East Timor. On the basis of mentioned conclusion, the President decided:

a. To respond positively and to accept the integration declaration of the people of East Timor.
b. The implementation of the integration will be done through a procedure which is not contrary to the constitutional process.
c. Within a short time, the Indonesian government will submit to the DPR a special bill on the acceptance/integration of East Timor into the territory of the Republic of Indonesia for approval.
d. As a consequence of that integration, the President instructs all authorities within the Republic of Indonesia to assist the people of East Timor in implementing development in East Timor.

Above mentioned bill and its clarification were submitted to the DPR on 1st July 1976. The bill which was discussed from 12th July in the lobbying of Commission II did not undergo any fundamental changes but editorial ones only. The bill consists of four articles. Article 1 reads: "To approve the integration of East Timor into the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia." Article 2: "To establish Timor Timur Province/Level I Region the territory of which is the former colony of Portugal;" Article 3: "Matters relating to the implementation of the two above mentioned provisions will be further regulated through a special legislation taking into account the situation and developments in East Timor." Article 4 states that this Act comes into force at the time of its promulgation.

On 15th July 1976, through its Plenary Session, the DPR agreed by acclamation to the approval of mentioned bill to become the act on the Integration of East Timor into the State of the Republic of Indonesia and the Establishment of East Timor Province/Level I Region (Act Number 7 of 1976).

Further, the signing of mentioned Act Number 7 of 1976 by President Soeharto at Bina Graha on 17th July 1976, means to the Indonesian people in

general and the people of East Timor in particular that the process of decolonisation has been completed. And East Timor has become the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia. Consequently, preceded by the singing of the national anthem, "Indonesia Raya" in the building of Timor Timur Level I Regional Representative Council, Dili, Minister of Home Affairs Amirmachmud installed the first Governor of East Timor, Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, and his Deputy, Francisco Xavier da Cruz, and the Speaker of Level I DPRD with his Deputy and 36 members.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

It is worthy of note that the UN dealing with the problem of East Timor has not only been insignificant, but there is also the impression that the UN has been unable to deal with and to settle the problem of conflicts of decolonisation. Although its efforts have achieved the level of the unanimous acceptance of a resolution by the Security Council and in addition a special representative of the UN Secretary General has been sent, namely the UN Director General in Geneva, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, as an observer to East Timor, who had at the same time the task to contact all parties involved in mentioned problem, facts have shown that all of those did not have any effect on the process of settling the problem of East Timor. The problem of East Timor has proceeded and developed on its own through patterns based on existing objective facts in East Timor, whereas the UN with its resolutions could be regarded as being mere lip service within the order of the obligations of that world organisation in regard to international problems submitted to her and to be faced by her.

The error conmitted by the UN in dealing with the problem of East Timor has been probably due to the fact that this world body did not adequately consider the problem she was facing on existing objective realities inherent in the problem. As a result the effect of UN's endeavour was very small if any. Meanwhile, the problem itself continued to proceed and to develop, so that the UN decisions as enunciated in the resolutions of the Trusteeship Committee of 11th December 1975, the resolutions of the General Assembly of 12th December 1975, and the resolutions of the Security Council of 22nd December 1975, and even the resolution of the Security Council of 22nd April 1976 did have no meaning at all with regard the process of settling the problem of East Timor.

After the process of decolonisation had been completed and East Timor had officially become the 27th province of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, the UN still discussed East Timor as a problem to be solved. The

first discussion after integration took place in the forum of the Committee of 24 (on decolonisation) on 8th September 1976, which was responded to by Indonesia as having the wrong address since the colony called East Timor no longer existed. In addition, Indonesia also asserted that the problem of East Timor represented Indonesia's internal affair. Nonetheless, on 17th November 1976, mentioned Committee approved a draft resolution which rejected the claim of East Timor as part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and called on Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor. And of course, Indonesia rejected such a resolution as the integration of East Timor had been the choice of the people of East Timor themselves. For that reason, although the following year East Timor was still debated in the sessions of the UN, it was only a futile effort as it neither has any significance anymore nor could it change the reality.

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